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Does global currency volume increase on days when the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) meets? To test the hypothesis of excess currency volume
on FOMC days, we use a novel data set from the Continuous Linked Set-
tlement (CLS) Bank. The CLS measure captures roughly half of the global
trading volume in foreign exchange (FX) markets. We ﬁnd strong evidence
that trading volume increases in the order of 5% across currency areas on
FOMC days during 2003 to 2007. This result holds irrespective of the size
of price changes in currency markets and FOMC policy shocks. The new
evidence of excess FX trading on FOMC days is inconsistent with standard
models of the asset market approach with homogenous agents.
Keywords: Trading volume, FOMC, Global linkages
JEL Classiﬁcation Number: F31, G12
1 Swiss National Bank and CEPR, Postfach, 8022 Zurich, Switzerland
telephone (+41 44) 631 32 94, FAX (+41 44) 631 81 72
e-mail: andreas.ﬁscher@snb.ch
2 Swiss National Bank, Postfach, 8022 Zurich, Switzerland
telephone (+41 44) 631 38 26, FAX (+41 44) 631 39 01
e-mail: angelo.ranaldo@snb.ch
* The authors thank J¨ urg M¨ agerle, and Andy Sturm for helpful discussions.
Fatum Rasmus, Jim Hughes, the IRTA group, and an anonymous referee
oﬀered helpful comments. The views expressed here are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reﬂect the position of the Swiss National Bank.Introduction
Does global currency volume increase on days when the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) meets? Currency traders and analysts monitor FOMC
meetings for information of imminent changes in the federal funds rate tar-
get, because interest rates are a fundamental determinant of exchange rates.
Ahn and Melvin (2007), Andersen et al. (2003), Faust et al. (2005), and
Hausman and Wongswan (2006) show that foreign exchange (FX) quotes re-
spond in a matter of minutes to public information (news) released by the
FOMC.1 Models of the asset market approach with homogenous beliefs are
the standard framework used by ﬁnancial economists to explain the price
response to FOMC news. However, as Lyons (2001) notes, models of the
asset market approach and many microstructure models are silent on issues
concerning FX turnover.
While there is consensus in the literature about the currency price re-
action to FOMC surprises, little is known about the volume response. A
1Other recent contributions of FX response to FOMC news include Chaboud et al.
(2004), Evans and Lyons (2005), Fatum and Scholnick (2007) Faust et al. (2006) and
Simpson et al. (2003). See also recent studies by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Ehrmann
and Fratzscher (2004), G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005), and Kuttner (2001) that examine the
price response of various ﬁnancial assets to FOMC announcements.
1similar FX volume reaction as currency prices to unanticipated news can be
intuitively explained by abnormal portfolio reshuﬄing in response to FOMC
news. This would mean that the well established return-volume relation de-
ﬁned as in Karpoﬀ (1987) for equity markets holds also for FX markets. On
the other hand, the existence of abnormal volumes on FOMC dates con-
trolling for policy surprises or price reactions would be diﬃcult to reconcile
with models of economic agents with homogenous beliefs and/or identical
interpretations.
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we test for abnormal trad-
ing in global FX markets on FOMC days. Upon establishing the robustness
of the FX volume response to public information released after central bank
meetings, a second objective is to determine the strength of FOMC policy
surprises as a driver of FX volume. We deﬁne the FOMC policy surprise as
in Kuttner (2005), using information from federal funds futures contracts.
The issue of FOMC policy surprise is of importance because Blinder et al.
(2007) argue that the objective of central bank communication is either to re-
duce market noise or to augment market volatility. Hence, focusing on price
responses without knowing whether FX volumes rose or fell does not give a
complete picture how FX markets respond to central bank communication.
2A diﬃcult hurdle for studies on global FX turnover is measurement. The
FX market is borderless, spans diﬀerent products, and many other market
microstructure aspects such as multiple trading platforms and diﬀerent trad-
ing venues (i.e., brokerage or interdealer market). Until now high frequency
studies such as Cai et al. (2007) and Chaboud and LeBaron (2001) deﬁne
FX volume behavior only for speciﬁc trading platforms or select markets or
as in Melvin and Yin (2003) use price ﬂuctuations as a crude measure of FX
volume. Neither of these methods are representative of global FX volume.
Our solution to the measurement problem of capturing global FX trad-
ing relies on settlement information from the Continuous Linked Settlement
(CLS) Bank in New York. The main advantage of CLS volume data is that
decentralized FX trades are centrally settled in New York. The novel data set
captures turnover activity in the spot, forward, and futures markets. Since
its introduction in September 2002, CLS Bank captures more than half of
the FX volume across major currencies at high frequencies.
The evidence in this paper shows an increase in FX turnover for the
three largest currencies on 40 FOMC days from 2003 to 2007. Evidence of a
volume response to other central bank meetings is weaker. Excess FX trading
occurs two full days after the FOMC concludes its meeting. The two-day lag
3is consistent with FX settlement in the spot market. We also ﬁnd that
irrespective of the price change in the exchange rate or FOMC policy shock,
CLS currency volume always increases on FOMC days. We also ﬁnd that
Kuttner’s (2005) measure of policy surprise does not fully account for the FX
volume response on FOMC days. This result means that narrow versions of
the asset market approach to exchange rates with homogenous beliefs (i.e.,
agents interpret public information identically) are overly restrictive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses measurement is-
sues of global FX turnover and presents the CLS data. Section 2 motivates
the empirical setup. The same section includes a discussion of the empirical
hypotheses, empirical estimation, and hypothesis testing. The empirical evi-
dence for currency volume and FOMC days is presented in section 3. Section
4 oﬀers conclusions.
1. Data Issues
This section addresses measurement issues of global FX turnover. First, the
gains and limits of a settlement-based deﬁnition of FX turnover are discussed.
Thereafter, we document the main properties of CLS currency volume.2
2The terms FX volume, FX trading activity, and FX turnover are used interchangeably
in this paper. CLS data refer to currency volume and not number of transactions. The
4CLS Data and FX Trading Volume3
A serious drawback of empirical studies on FX volume is measurement.
Data availability is problematic because the FX market is highly decentral-
ized in terms of location, currency product, and trading platforms. Aggrega-
tion is further complicated because FX transactions span diﬀerent national
and legal jurisdictions, time zones, and domestic payments systems.
Previous empirical studies of international ﬁnance use three measures of
trading volume. Each has its drawbacks. The ﬁrst is the BIS Triennial
Survey of global turnover in traditional product markets (i.e., spot, forward,
and swap markets). The three-year frequency and the evolving coverage of
the BIS survey on currency volume, however, represent a serious limitation
for empirical research studying the dynamics of global FX turnover. A second
method used by Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991), Melvin and Peiers Melvin
latter is often used as a measure of FX volume. However, since FX trades are standardized
our results should hold for the number of transactions.
3This section relies heavily on McPortland (2006), Millar and Northcott (2002), and
Saywer (2004). They provide further institutional discussions from the perspective of
payments systems and infrastructure. See Galati (2002), Kahn and Roberds (2001), and
Lacker (2001) for discussions concerning the role of CLS and risks of international payment
settlement.
5(2003), and Melvin and Yin (2003) proxies FX volume with price movements,
i.e., with indicative quotes or transactions data for speciﬁc currency markets.
Although favored by empirical researchers because of its high frequency, FX
volume remains a latent variable and is market speciﬁc. A third approach
favored by Chaboud and LeBaron (2001), Chaboud et al. (2004), and Cai
et al. (2007) measures transaction volume for select markets and trading
platforms. While this latter approach represents a step forward in capturing
FX volume at high frequencies, it is still product speciﬁc.4
Observing market activity at the back-end is a way out of the coverage-
frequency dilemma. Rather than measuring currency volume at transaction
time, an alternative measure is at settlement time. The main advantage
of such a back-end measure of FX volume is that roughly 55% of the cur-
rency transactions in traditional markets are settled in a centralized manner
through the CLS Bank in New York.5 Moreover, CLS coverage includes FX
volume from customer dealers, brokered dealers, and direct dealers. CLS
4The BIS surveys, for example, mention repeatedly that the growth in the spot market
does not move in tandem with the swap market. Table B.1 in BIS (2005) shows that the
smaller currency markets, spot and outright forwards, grew faster between 2001 and 2004
(at 60%) than the larger swap market (40%).
5See table 8 of the CPSS (2007) survey.
6volume data are available at high frequencies and ensure a representative
coverage of global FX turnover.
FX transactions, by deﬁnition, involve two currencies, the currency sold
and the currency purchased. FX transactions always have a trade date and
a settlement date.6 The former is the date when both parties come together
and deﬁne the terms of the trade. The latter, also known as the value date,
is the day common to both countries in which the counter-parties of the
transaction will pay the agreed currency amount. FX transactions through
the CLS Bank can only be settled on business (banking) days common to both
countries. European and North American banking holidays often coincide.
This however is often not the case for Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The
process of determining value dates for FX transactions is precise. FX trades
settle following conventional settlement practices, i.e., spot transactions are
settled two days after the trade date; forward transactions are settled 30, 60,
or 90 calendar days after the trade date; and futures transactions are settled
on the Wednesday following the third Monday of March, June, September,
and December.7 In the next section, we argue that the settlement convention
6For some FX products, such as swaps, the two legs of the operations are deﬁned in
advance.
7These four dates are the International Monetary Market dates: the settlement dates
7of t+2 for the spot market is linked with volume movements in the spot
market.
Data Properties of CLS Volumes
The empirical sample based on CLS trading volume (unsigned gross ﬂows)
considers the top ﬁve most actively traded exchange rates: the U.S. dol-
lar (USD), the euro (EUR), the Japanese yen (JPY), the British pound
(GBP), and the Swiss franc (CHF).8 The daily sample is from 1.10.2002 to
31.12.2007. The sample’s size is restricted by CLS’s introduction beginning
in late September 2002. CLS currency volumes are denominated in U.S.
dollar and are not corrected for double accounting.
CLS currency volumes are characterized by large swings and positive
trends. Trading volume for example in the U.S. dollar ﬂuctuated by more
than 10% on days following a bank holiday and grew 1032% over the sam-
ple. In contrast, the volume in the Japanese yen is subject to smaller daily
ﬂuctuations and grew less than a third as quick (317%). A recent CPSS
for all FX futures contracts traded on the the International Monetary Market, a division
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and on the Financial Instrument Exchange division
of the New York Board of Trade.
8According to the most recent BIS Triennial Survey (2007), the ﬁve currencies account
for 80.1% (84.5%) of the total turnover in 2007 (2004).
8(2007) study cited diﬀerences in the willingness to adopt CLS technology,
the number of FX linked products, and the vehicle status of the USD as
major reasons for the non-congruous behavior of CLS currency volumes.
The CLS data were ﬁltered in the following manner. To deal with the
inherent trends, we follow Chaboud and LeBaron (2001) and create a de-
trended volume variable for each currency. The variable, NV OLt, is the








Next, bank holidays and expiration dates of futures contracts are dropped
from the sample to reduce the variance and the eﬀects of potential outliers
for the higher moments.
The trend correction in equation (1) does not eliminate daily and weekly
eﬀects (i.e., monthly eﬀects were not detected). Following MacDonald and
Marsh (1996) in their study on IMM futures volume, we ﬁlter the deter-
ministic eﬀects by regressing ln(NV OLt) = nvolt on daily dummies and six
lags:







9where Dayk is a dummy that captures day-of-the-week eﬀects.9
Table 1 presents statistical information for the residuals from regression
equation (2). The insigniﬁcant autocorrelation coeﬃcients (AC) reveal that
serial correlation is not a problem. Instead, the low p-values from the White
and the ARCH(1) tests indicate that the ﬁltered volume series are het-
eroskedastic. Information from the third and fourth moment shows that
the distribution of the residuals is fat-tailed and subject to outliers: a result
consistent with FX prices.
2. Hypothesis Tests and Empirical Setup
The excess volume hypothesis states that FX traders reshuﬄe their port-
folios on FOMC days. Excess trading may stem from either new information
released at the time of the FOMC meeting or from a market response to
informed traders. Excess trading for ﬁve currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, GBP,
and CHF) is ﬁrst tested with the following equation:










where FOMCt is a dummy (i.e., FOMCt = 1 when the FOMC meets, oth-
erwise FOMCt = 0). The direction criterion of nvolt > 0 and FOMCt >
9The lag order was checked with statistical tests.
100 says that FX volume on FOMC days is larger than the 66-day moving
average prior to the meeting.
The dummy variable, FOMCt−i, enters i = {0, ···, 5} to capture FX
trading in diﬀerent FX markets. The ﬁrst case is for i = 0. A volume
response for i = 0 implies that FX trading (prior to the FOMC meeting)
takes place in the derivatives market or possibly in the spot market.10 For
the preannouncement eﬀect, we assume that FX traders are either hedging or
speculating on (scheduled) future interest rate decisions. The second case is
for i = 3. FX traders respond to news after the FOMC discloses its decision
at 2:15 EST and accounts for two-day settlement in the spot market. Since
European (Japanese) markets are already closed (not yet open) when the
FOMC concludes its deliberations, an international response occurs at t + 1
and spot market settlement two days later at t+3. To capture the duration
10Numerous studies ﬁnd that FX markets respond before released information. Peiers
(1997) and Dominguez (2003), for example, show that exchange rates respond before
central banks intervene in the FX market.
11of excess FX volume, we also consider days further out (i.e., i > 3).11
To test whether large FOMC shocks generate greater FX trading, we add
FOMCt*|FF
t | and ﬁve lags along with |FF
t | and ﬁve lags to equation (3):


























The measure of (absolute) policy surprise, |FF
t |, follows Kuttner (2001). The
surprise measure is based on price changes in the federal funds futures con-
tracts (appropriately re-scaled).12 Following standard practice, we construct
our FOMC shock by working with a 30 minute window between 2:10 EST
and 2:40 EST to capture the policy surprise before and after the release of
the FOMC statement at 2:15 EST.
Equation (4) also controls for the interaction between absolute FX re-
turns, FX volume, and FOMC events. Jones et al. (1994), Karpoﬀ (1987),
11Endogeneity is not a problem in this context. The relation between trading volume
and FOMC decisions can be interpreted as proof that information from FOMC meetings
or anticipated news generate an increase in FX trading activity. This stems from the
observation that high FX volume does not cause scheduled FOMC meetings.
12Numerous empirical studies ﬁnd the federal funds futures contract an extremely eﬃ-
cient measure for market expectations of future monetary policy, see Kreuger and Kuttner
(1996), Kuttner (2001), Piazzesi and Swanson (2004), Sack (2002), and Sack et al. (2004).
12and others have identiﬁed a positive correlation between volume and abso-
lute returns for prices of various assets. Higher price volatility is linked with
higher turnover activity primarily in the tails of the distribution. To control
for absolute returns for the dollar in the volume-FOMC relation, we con-
struct a measure of absolute price returns. This is necessary, because the
CLS Bank does not provide an average currency price for settled trades. We
build a (daily) trade weighted variable under the assumption that the spot
price at noon EST is a valid proxy for settled transactions with CLS Bank.13
We denote the (daily) absolute dollar return as |∆sUSD
t | and add this variable
and ﬁve lags to equation (4).
Equation (4) is motivated by the asset market approach to exchange rates
with homogenous agents, see Lyons (2001). Bonser-Neal et al. (1998) argue
that FOMC news changes expectations, causing the exchange rate to jump
to a new level. In our case, a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the cross product,
|FF
t | (i.e., ωg > 0 and βi = 0) is consistent with the asset market assumption
of homogenous beliefs when testing for excess trading on FOMC days. Al-
ternatively, if FOMCt remains signiﬁcant even in the presence of |FF
t |, such
13The Federal Reserve Bank of New York records the spot rate at noon. The results
presented in the next section are not sensitive to other daily spot rate quotes.
13evidence says that the policy surprise is not fully capturing the volume re-
sponse on FOMC days and the asset market model with homogenous beliefs
(in the strict sense) is rejected.
3. Estimation Results
This section presents evidence of excess FX turnover on 40 scheduled FOMC
days for the period 1.1.2003 to 31.12.2007.14 First, the relationship between
FX volume and FOMC meetings is established. Next, we show that our
evidence on FX volume and FOMC meeting is contingent on FOMC news
type. Last, evidence on FX returns, FOMC shocks, and FOMC meetings is
presented.
Global FX Activity and FOMC Meetings
This subsection documents evidence of excess FX activity on FOMC days
based on the variable of interest, FOMCt−i for i = {0, 1,···, 5}, in equation
(3). Table 2 summarizes the regressions for ﬁve currency volumes: USD,
EUR, JPY, GBP, and CHF. The coeﬃcient estimates for daily eﬀects and
lagged nvolt−j are not shown. Information from Table 2 highlights two ob-
14The FOMC released a statement on 14.08.2007. We did not include this meeting as a
scheduled FOMC meeting. The inclusion or exclusion of this observation has no bearing
on our results.
14servations about FOMC days. The ﬁrst is that there is a (near) synchronous
response for the ﬁve currencies. Currency volume increases on FOMC days
at t; followed by a decline at t−1 and t−2; and thereafter with a rise at t−3
and t−4. The directional pattern is however not signiﬁcant across currency
volumes. The second observation is that only the major three currencies
show signiﬁcant evidence of an excess volume response following an FOMC
meeting at the 5% level.15 GBP volume does not respond signiﬁcantly to
FOMC meetings. The FOMC dummy is signiﬁcant at t−2 for CHF volume;
a time when global currency volume fell.
A closer look at the strongest volume response to FOMC days reveals that
USD volume increases in the order of 5% at t, t−3, and t−4. For each of these
dates, FX volume is signiﬁcant. The strong USD volume response stems from
the observation that cross currency activity outside of the dollar is limited
and that hedging possibilities are scarce in other currencies. The lagged
eﬀect for FOMCt−3 and FOMCt−4 is consistent with international portfolio
reshuﬄing in the cash market after the FOMC concludes its deliberations.
15All standard errors are corrected using White heteroskedastic-consistent stand errors.
A GARCH setup revealed that our empirical results are not sensitive as to how we model
the variance.
15For the contemporaneous FOMC eﬀect, it is not possible to identify which
FX market is responsible for the (pre announcement) impact.
Figure 1 shows the average change in USD volume 15 days before and 20
days after FOMC days. The ﬁgure shows the coeﬃcient for FOMCt from 36
regressions speciﬁed by equation (2) with FOMCt−i for i = {-15, -14, ···, 19,
20}. The daily ﬂuctuations in FX turnover are more pronounced before the
FOMC meeting than after the meeting. The daily changes in USD volume
swing between -4% and +5%. In only one instance at t + 5 is the coeﬃcient
for FOMCt+5 signiﬁcant at the 5% level. FX volume increases following the
FOMC meeting at t − 3 and t − 4 and then tappers oﬀ. During the 10-day
period from t − 5 to T − 14, FX volume declines by an accumulated 20%.16
To understand whether the result of excess FX volume on FOMC days
holds for other central bank meetings, Table 3 presents information on FX
volume and scheduled central bank meetings by the European Central Bank
(ECB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), and the Bank of England (BoE).17 FX
16Bomﬁm (2000) and Jones et al. (1998) claim FOMC days calm stock and bonds.
Visually this can be seen in Figure 1, but it is not supported by empirical tests using a
GARCH setup.
17Excess volume on Swiss National Bank days was not considered, because the number
of (non overlapping) observations is less than 10.
16volume is for USD volume and domestic currency volume. Unlike in the case
of FOMC days, no congruous response pattern of excess volume emerges
for either currency volume for ECB, BoJ, or BoE meetings. The central
bank dummy is negatively signiﬁcant for the ECB at t and for the BoE at
t−1. The observation that FX activity responds stronger to FOMC meetings
than other central bank meetings is consistent with studies by Almeida et al.
(1998) that examine the price response of currencies to central bank news.18
We interpret the timing evidence based on dummy variable analysis in Tables
2 and 3 as follows: USD volumes increase strongly after the FOMC concludes
its meeting but not for other central bank meetings.
USD Volume and FOMC Actions
The previous subsection treated FOMC days as a deterministic eﬀect ir-
respective of FOMC actions. In this subsection we present evidence on USD
volume and information released after the FOMC meetings. First, we con-
sider whether days when the FOMC changed the federal funds rate target
18The importance of news from FOMC meetings on FX markets versus news from other
central banks has also been examined for money announcements by Ito and Roley (1987)
and central bank interventions by Dominguez (2003). More recent comparative studies on
central bank communication by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) and De Haan and Jansen
(2004) ﬁnd that FX markets do not respond equally to central bank news.
17generated a stronger volume response than on days when the FOMC under-
took no change in the target. Table 4 summarizes this information for USD
volume. For comparative purposes, the results from FOMCt−i are presented
in the ﬁrst column. In columns (2) and (3) of Table 4, regression estimates
for separate FOMC actions are presented: change in FF is a dummy for 18
FOMC days when a change in the federal funds rate target occurred and no
change in FF is a dummy for 22 FOMC days when the federal funds rate
target remained unchanged. Again, we used equation (3) as our baseline
model and show the coeﬃcient estimates for the FOMC dummy only. The
regressions for federal funds rate changes or no changes show that the de-
layed volume response at t−3 and t−4 (attributed to two-day settlement in
the cash market) holds. However, USD volumes respond stronger to FOMC
days with a change in the federal funds rate target (column two) than when
no change occurred (column three). A null hypothesis of coeﬃcient equality
for the two FOMC days is rejected with a p-value of 0.001.
Next, we consider the inﬂuence of future interest rate leanings on FX
volume. As in Pakko (2005) and Thornton and Wheelock (2000), we review
the FOMC statements and classify future FOMC leanings (i.e., future interest
rate cuts or increases) into neutral and non-neutral categories. The latter
18group is when the FOMC statement states that if the current assessment
of the balance of risks materializes then future changes in the federal funds
rate target are warranted, while the former do not indicate a change in the
future path of interest rates.19 There are 21 neutral leanings versus 19 non-
neutral leanings. Columns (5) and (6) in Table 4 show coeﬃcient estimates
for non neutral and neutral FOMC leanings from separate regressions. The
coeﬃcient estimates show that non neutral leanings with up to the fourth lag
generate a larger reaction in USD volume than do neutral leanings. Imminent
changes in FOMC policy heighten FX activity. USD volume does not react
to our measure of neutral leanings. The null hypothesis that neutral and
non-neutral leanings have the same eﬀect on USD volume is rejected with a
p-value of 0.006.
USD Volume and Federal Funds Futures
As a further check of the results in Table 2 and the assumption of homoge-
nous beliefs under the asset price model, we consider whether USD volume
responds to policy surprises as deﬁned by equation (4). Table 5 summarizes
the expanded regressions for the cross product, FOMCt*|FF
t |. The main
result is that FOMCt−3*|FF
t−3| is always signiﬁcant for alternative speciﬁ-
19Our classiﬁcation is available upon request.
19cations, upholding the earlier volume-FOMC relation for the spot market.
Column (1) presents cross product coeﬃcients from a regression of USD vol-
ume on the cross product and ﬁve lags with the day of the week dummy and
six lags of USD volume. Only the coeﬃcients for FOMCt*|FF
t | are shown in
Table 5. The variable, FOMCt−3*|FF
t−3|, has an extremely large coeﬃcient.
A 1% price change (within a half hour time span) in the federal funds futures
contract will increase FX trading by more than 200% for an FOMC day.20
The variable, FOMCt−3*|FF
t−3|, along with the pre-announcement eﬀect for
FOMCt*|FF
t | are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Column (2) of Table 5 shows that the coeﬃcient estimates for FOMCt*|FF
t |
are sensitive to the addition of FOMCt and ﬁve lags. Although the signif-
icance of FOMCt*|FF
t | and FOMCt−3*|FF
t−3| is upheld, the F-test of the
FOMC dummies in column (2) shows that these variables are signiﬁcant.
The signiﬁcance of the FOMC dummies means that the strict version of the
asset market approach to exchange rates with homogenous beliefs is not fully
capturing information related to FOMC days.
Columns (3) and (4) show that the signiﬁcance of FOMCt−3*|FF
t−3| holds
when controlling for |FF
t | and ﬁve lags in the speciﬁcations deﬁned in columns
20This result (238/48) is consistent with the FOMCt results of 5% in Table 2.
20(1) and (2). However, this is not true for the pre-announcement eﬀect of
FOMCt*|FF
t |. It is no longer signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The p-value
for an F-test for the the FOMC dummies shown in column (4) is 0.07. Again,
this says that the FOMC dummies are capturing information around FOMC
days that is not correlated with policy surprises, |FF
t |. An F-test for the
(joint) null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for |FF
t−f| for f = {0, ··· , 5} are
zero cannot be rejected.21
The evidence of the return-volume relation on FOMC days is presented in
columns (5) and (6) of Table 5. The main result is that the volume response
to FOMC days holds even when we control for absolute returns. The variable,
FOMCt−3*|FF
t−3|, remains signiﬁcant at the 5% level regardless whether we
control for FOMCt (see column 6). Unlike |FF
t |, |∆sUSD
t | are found to be
positively correlated with daily USD volume. The p-values of the F-test show
that absolute price returns are signiﬁcant at conventional levels, extending
Karpoﬀ’s (1987) ﬁnding of return-volume relation for currency markets.22
21We experimented with diﬀerent windows for |FF
t |. Regardless if the window is 30
minutes or open to close the results did not change. This result conﬁrms the results in
G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005) for monetary policy shocks and asset prices.
22It is important to recall that, unlike FOMCt−3*|FF
t−3|, |∆sUSD
t | should not be treated
as a causal variable of FX volume.
21From the signiﬁcant F-test for FOMCt−g, it is possible to determine that
large FX volume activity at the time of the FOMC meeting is associated
with large exchange rate movements in prices.
We interpret the evidence in Tables 2 to 5 as follows. FOMC meetings are
events that generate an increase in FX volume for the three largest currencies.
Excess FX trading, particularly for the USD, is observed with a lag following
the FOMC meeting and has a duration of two business days; a phenomenon
which is longer than FX price responses to FOMC news, see Ahn and Melvin
(2007), Andersen et al. (2003), Bonser et al. (1998), Faust et al. (2005),
and Hausman and Wongswan (2006). The lagged response in FX turnover
is consistent with two-day settlement in the FX spot market. The FOMC
response suggests that currency traders reshuﬄe their portfolios when the
FOMC meets and especially in the face of FOMC actions.
It is important to qualify our results in light of potential weaknesses.
First, Anderson et al. (2003) showed that FX markets respond to a range
of newswire releases and ﬁnancial market surveys. Our study focuses solely
on FOMC meetings as a driver of FX volume, thus an open issue is the
FX volume response to FOMC days relative to other forms of news. Sec-
ond, our sample is dominated by low ﬁnancial market volatility, see Panetta
22et al. (2006). Although we conjecture that excess FX trading on FOMC
days should increase in a period of greater market turbulence with numerous
unscheduled FOMC meetings (i.e., post July 2007), the paucity of observa-
tions do not allow us to test for this. Third, the analysis focused on the
FX turnover response to 40 FOMC meetings. Event studies on FOMC days
range between 10 (see, Ahn and Melvin, 2007) and 199 observations (see,
Rudebusch, 1995). Despite working with the largest possible sample, it can-
not be excluded that the study’s empirical results are subject to a small
sample bias.
4. Conclusions
The paper investigates the dynamics of global FX trading on FOMC days.
Until now the FX response to monetary policy actions has focused on price
changes with limited insight into how global currency volume behaves. As
noted by Lyons (2001) and Blinder et al. (2007), understanding the behavior
of global currency volume is important for central bank communication.
We use CLS data on FX settlement volume as our measure of global
FX turnover that encompasses transactions from spot, forward, and futures
markets. We ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant increase in global turnover two
23(full) days following a scheduled FOMC meeting. The two-day result is
consistent with settlement trading in the spot market and reconﬁrms the
view that the spot market is the most active FX market. We also ﬁnd that
irrespective of the size of the exchange rate change or FOMC news type,
global currency volume always increases on FOMC days. The excess trading
result says that larger than average portfolio shifts occur after the FOMC
deliberates.
Our empirical results have implications for the interaction between ex-
change rate volume and monetary policy actions. First, the observation
that excess FX turnover is identiﬁed in the spot market after the FOMC
meets means that previous attempts to capture FX turnover in select FX
markets such as the futures market cannot be representative of global FX
trading. Second, the result that FOMC days generate high levels of FX trad-
ing even when accounting for monetary surprises and absolute price changes
is not consistent with exchange rate models that assume homogenous agents.
Third, the evidence on CLS volume shows that it is diﬃcult to make state-
ments about central bank transparency without knowing what happens to
FX volume. Even if central banks communicate transparently (see Blinder
et al. (2007)) and a small price response is observed, this should not be
24necessarily interpreted that international portfolio reshuﬄing will be low.
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30Table 1: Residual Properties of the (Filtered) CLS Series (2003-2007)
CHF EUR GBP JPY USD
Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Median -0.0041 -0.0086 -0.0082 -0.0059 -0.0019
Maximum 0.8255 0.6812 0.7091 0.7314 0.6824
Minimum -0.3899 -0.3804 -0.4282 -0.3711 -0.6525
Std. Dev. 0.1256 0.1220 0.1251 0.1294 0.1194
Skewness 0.7948 0.7676 0.9166 1.2677 0.4614
Kurtosis 7.1409 5.8413 7.0585 8.6141 9.4118
Jarque-Bera 534.4920 318.5398 574.3131 905.9700 1307.8420
Observations 652 733 695 573 745
AC1 0.0400 0.0040 -0.0090 -0.0090 -0.0020
AC2 0.0180 -0.0150 -0.0020 -0.0180 -0.0220
AC3 -0.0100 -0.0130 0.0020 -0.0160 0.0010
AC4 -0.0300 -0.0500 0.0170 -0.0290 -0.0540
AC5 -0.0010 0.0110 -0.0020 -0.0180 -0.0260
AC6 -0.0570 -0.0020 -0.0070 -0.0110 -0.0230
AC7 0.0130 -0.0180 -0.0180 0.0020 -0.0080
AC8 0.0030 0.0000 -0.0330 0.0080 0.0090
AC9 -0.0290 0.0200 0.0210 0.0080 0.0170
AC10 -0.0010 -0.0130 0.0350 0.0110 -0.0250
White test No cross terms 0.0590 0.1791 0.0610 0.0003 0.0098
Cross terms 0.0061 0.9734 0.0061 0.0003 0.0097
ARCH(1) 0.0566 0.0822 0.0089 0.0151 0.0265
ARCH(2) 0.1805 0.2188 0.0928 0.0430 0.1285
ARCH(5) 0.3626 0.1678 0.2562 0.2556 0.4160
Notes: FX volume in USD and ﬁltered with a 66-day moving average trend excluding holidays,
futures expiration dates, and seasonality. AC(x) denotes autocorrelation coeﬃcient order x.
White test gives the p-values. ARCH(x) p-values of an ARCH test order x. Bold numbers
denotes signiﬁcant at the 5
31Table 2: FX Volume and FOMC Meetings










currency nvolt USD EUR JPY GBP CHF
FOMCt 0.0535** 0.0421 0.0263 0.0219 0.0320
(0.0207) (0.0262) (0.0242) (0.0277) (0.0208)
FOMCt−1 -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0264 0.0162 0.0035
(0.0328) (0.0394) (0.0437) (0.0447) (0.0272)
FOMCt−2 -0.0243 -0.0278 -0.0148 -0.0320 -0.0469**
(0.0286) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0284) (0.0234)
FOMCt−3 0.0546** 0.0187 0.0479** 0.0022 0.0100
(0.0203) (0.0177) (0.0239) (0.0218) (0.0271)
FOMCt−4 0.0449** 0.0342* 0.0452** -0.0108 0.0041
(0.0197) (0.0179) (0.0213) (0.0235) (0.0202)
FOMCt−5 -0.0300 -0.0461* -0.0054 -0.0079 -0.0205
(0.0221) (0.0277) (0.0274) (0.0263) (0.0252)
Number of Obs. 745 804 643 763 804
R2 0.421 0.540 0.452 0.473 0.449
Notes: nvolt is FX volume for ﬁve currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, GBP, CHF),
FOMCt is a dummy for FOMC days, and Dayk is a day-of-the-week dummy.
Only the coeﬃcients for FOMCt in the above regression are shown. * and **
denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% and the 5% level. Standard errors are White
heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. Sample is from 1.1.2003 to 31.12.2007.
32Table 3: FX Volume and BoJ, ECB, and BoE Meetings










currency nvolt USD USD USD EUR JPY GBP
Central Bank Meeting CBt ECB BoJ BoE ECB BoJ BoE
CBt -0.0709** 0.0198 -0.0213 -0.0624* -0.0248 0.0054
(0.0299) (0.0230) (0.0214) (0.0329) (0.0308) (0.0218)
CBt−1 0.0161 0.0322 -0.0421** -0.0120 0.0317 -0.0543**
(0.0267) (0.0238) (0.0179) (0.0305) (0.0351) (0.0189)
CBt−2 -0.0169 0.0253 0.0241 0.0159 -0.0047 0.0396
(0.0316) (0.0251) (0.0238) (0.0218) (0.0380) (0.0286)
CBt−3 -0.0073 -0.0344 0.0251 -0.0126 -0.0038 -0.0233
(0.0163) (0.0282) (0.0239) (0.0208) (0.0334) (0.0300)
CBt−4 -0.0060 -0.0375 0.0250 0.0058 -0.0342 0.0078
(0.0197) (0.0272) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0318) (0.0346)
CBt−5 -0.0192 -0.0424 -0.0028 -0.0403 -0.0141 0.0156
(0.0191) (0.0324) (0.0274) (0.0259) (0.0319) (0.0214)
Number of Obs. 745 810 810 768 643 760
Number of CB meetings 55 38 52 55 38 52
R2 0.452 0.447 0.452 0.549 0.452 0.474
Notes: nvolt is FX volume for four currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, GBP), CBt is a dummy for three central
bank meetings (ECB, BoJ, BoE) and Dayk is a day-of-the-week dummy. Only the coeﬃcients for CBt in
the above regression are shown. * and ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% and the 5% level. Standard errors
are White heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. Sample is from 1.1.2003 to 31.12.2007.
33Table 4: USD Volume and FOMC Type











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FOMC∗
t All (FOMCt−i) Change in FF No Change in FF non neutral leanings neutral leanings
FOMC∗
t 0.0535** 0.0809** 0.0227 0.0806** 0.0202
(0.0207) (0.0262) (0.0287) (0.0257) (0.0346)
FOMC∗
t−1 -0.0009 0.03989 -0.0068 0.0404 0.0092
(0.0328) (0.0588) (0.0258) (0.0510) (0.0358))
FOMC∗
t−2 -0.0243 -0.0586 0.0353 -0.0291 -0.0430
(0.0286) (0.0429) (0.0272) (0.0491) (0.0360)
FOMC∗
t−3 0.0546** 0.0721** 0.0476** 0.0737** -0.0243
(0.0203) (0.0177) (0.0209) (0.0345) (0.0362)
FOMC∗
t−4 0.0449** 0.0647** 0.0675** 0.1001** 0.0217
(0.0197) (0.0179) (0.0265) (0.0296) (0.0411)
FOMC∗
t−5 -0.0300 0.0148 0.0004 0.0301 0.0815**
(0.0221) (0.0255) (0.0306) (0.0283) (0.0416)
Number of Obs. 745 745 745 745 745
Number of FOMC meetings 40 18 22 19 21
R2 0.421 0.417 0.406 0.417 0.413
Notes: nvolt is USD volume only, FOMC∗
t is a dummy for FOMC days and the following conditions (FOMC day,
change in the federal funds rate target (FF), no change in the federal funds rate target, non neutral leaning,
neutral leaning) and Dayk is a day-of-the-week dummy. Only the coeﬃcients for FOMC∗
t in the above regression
are shown. * and ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% and the 5% level. Standard errors are White heteroskedastic
consistent standard errors. Sample is from 1.1.2003 to 31.12.2007.
34Table 5: USD Volume and FOMC Shocks























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
restrictions in (4) δh = βg = κf = 0 δh = κf = 0 δh = βg = 0 δh = 0 βg = 0 none
FOMCt*|FF
t | 0.4554** 0.3070** 0.8330 0.6454 1.0642* 0.8403
(0.1577) (0.1089) (0.6154) (0.5975) (0.6005) (0.5827)
FOMCt−1*|FF
t−1| 0.6765 0.8708 1.1243 1.4632 1.3032 1.5819
(1.3754) (1.3572) (1.5095) (1.4856) (1.5391) (1.5171)
FOMCt−2*|FF
t−2| 1.1447 1.7143 1.8773 2.0417 1.7391 1.8860
(1.1835) (1.3882) (1.3337) (1.3328) (1.2564) (1.2594)
FOMCt−3*|FF
t−3| 2.3689** 2.0502** 1.9988** 1.9303** 2.0571** 1.9303**
(0.5606) (0.5974) (0.83332) (0.8541) (0.8321) (0.8527)
FOMCt−4*|FF
t−4| 1.2539 0.6123 1.3207 1.3750 1.0528 1.0989
(0.7832) (0.7081) (0.9928) (0.9610) (0.9074) (0.8918)
FOMCt−5*|FF
t−5| -0.0571 -0.0037 0.0252 0.0935 0.2653 0.3050







t−h | 0.090 0.016
Σ5
g=0ωgFOMCt−g 0.050 0.070 0.012
Number of Obs. 745 745 745 745 745 745
R2 0.412 0.422 0.414 0.428 0.423 0.436
Notes: nvolt is USD volume, FOMCt is a dummy for FOMC days, |FF
t | is the absolute value of federal funds rate
shock deﬁned by Kuttner (2001), |∆sUSD
t | is the absolute daily price change in (trade weighted) US dollar, and Dayk
is a day of the week dummy. Only the coeﬃcients for FOMCt*|FF
t | in the above regression are shown. Sig. Test is an
F-test for the signiﬁcance of the listed variables and their lags (p-values are shown). * and ** denotes signiﬁcance at the
























































Figure 1: Average change in USD volume before and after a FOMC day                  
Note: Shaded point denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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